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THE (IR)RATIONALITY OF (UN)INFORMED CONSENT 
Barbara A. Noah* 
 
“Enough is as good as a feast.”1 
 
Imagine life as a long airplane flight. At birth, the plane gathers 
speed and lifts up into the air. In the early and middle years, if all goes 
well, it continues to gain altitude as we learn, grow, and establish some 
sort of career and family life. At some point, however, we achieve peak 
altitude and cruise at that height for a while. At some later point, the 
plane begins its descent and, eventually, approaches a landing strip. As 
the plane touches down and hurtles along the tarmac, its velocity de-
creases and it comes to a halt. The question many of us will face at the 
end of life is how long to spend in that final stage, decelerating on the 
landing strip. How much therapy and life-prolonging treatment is 
“enough” at the end of life? 
Various public figures recently have generated interest in end-of-
life matters. Brittany Maynard, a young woman with a brain tumor, 
spoke out about the lack of a medically-assisted-dying option in her 
home state of California—and moved to Oregon in order to obtain this 
assistance and avoid the inevitable and severe suffering associated with 
the end stages of her illness.2 For every Brittany Maynard who faces 
 
 * Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. Thank you to the 
organizers of this symposium event for their excellent work and to René Reich-Graefe for his 
thoughtful comments. This essay is dedicated to the memory of my father, David Shepardson 
Pond.  © Barbara A. Noah 2016. 
 1 P.L. TRAVERS, MARY POPPINS (London, Harper Collins, 1934). 
 2 See George F. Will, Affirming a Right to Die with Dignity, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 
Noah - FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/3/2016 2:58 PM 
692 Q U I N N I P I A C  L A W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 34:691 
 
death with pragmatism and dignity (while generating a good deal of pub-
lic debate, admiration, and sympathy), there are the Larry Kings of this 
world who publicly rail against it.3 In a recent interview, the 81-year-old 
King described the various measures he takes to stave off aging and 
acknowledged that he finds his own death unimaginable.4 Ezekiel 
Emanuel has expressed yet another view—the desire to live a reasonably 
long life but to die before the usual disabilities of age overwhelm his 
functionality and ability to contribute to the world.5 These various ap-
proaches to dying illustrate vastly different abilities to confront mortali-
ty. Interestingly, it is the 29-year-old rather than the 81-year-old who is 
ready to accept death, even to descend early to the landing strip. In one 
respect, all three approaches promote the autonomous wishes of the in-
dividual in question—to avoid suffering by curtailing the dying process; 
to live as long as possible no matter what the physical or psychic cost, 
hoping for an ever-lengthening landing strip; to die at the “optimal” 
time, navigating the narrow gap between premature and “too late” death. 
And yet, these three approaches to mortality also share a common 
theme: the desire to exert control over that which ultimately cannot be 
controlled—a desire for control that is fundamentally at odds with the 
layers of uncertainty described in this essay. 
The increased utilization of therapies and life-prolonging technolo-
gies at the end of life and its attendant ill effects on the experience of dy-




 3 See Mark Leibovich, Larry King Is Preparing for the Final Cancellation, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/larry-king-is-
preparing-for-the-final-cancellation.html?_r=0. 
 4 See id. (“I can’t get my head around one minute being there and another minute ab-
sent.”). King also would love to attend his own funeral, stating, “I would like the ceremony to 
begin, ‘Today we are honoring a 160-year-old man who was caught in bed by an irate hus-
band . . . .’” Id. 
 5 See Ezekiel Emanuel, Why I Hope to Die at 75, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/10/why-i-hope-to-die-at-75/379329/. 
Emanuel persuasively critiques the American desire for “immortality” but his personal vision 
of dying in his prime epitomizes a kind of vanity that is equally troubling. He writes,  
[L]iving too long is also a loss. It renders many of us, if not disabled, then faltering 
and declining, a state that may not be worse than death but is nonetheless de-
prived. . . . It transforms how people experience us, relate to us, and, most im-
portant, remember us. We are no longer remembered as vibrant and engaged but 
as feeble, ineffectual, even pathetic. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 6 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING 
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE  (2014), 
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tics provide a snapshot of trends in end-of-life care: Only about one-
third of patients in the United States die at home.7 We utilize significant 
amounts of hospital-based resources at the end of life,8 often with little 
or no measurable benefit to dying patients. Many patients in the U.S. re-
ceive interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, ventilator 
support, or ICU care even when they are very near to death.9 And these 
trends are not improving.10 This pattern of utilization of care at the end 
of life comes with serious costs to patients, families, and society. Immi-
nently dying patients receive costly and invasive therapeutic care and 
life-prolonging treatment even when it is very likely that the benefits in 
terms of enhanced quality of life, increased survival time, or other meas-
urable physical outcomes are limited or non-existent.11 In fact, the de-
fault model is to provide life-sustaining care and often to continue thera-
peutic treatment, unless the patient goes through the emotionally and 
intellectually taxing effort of either a properly informed or a rather unin-
 
http://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/2014/Dying-In-America-Improving-Quality-and-
Honoring-Individual-Preferences-Near-the-End-of-Life.aspx (roundly criticizing the care of 
the dying in the United States); see also ATUL GAWANDE, BEING MORTAL 259 (2014) (argu-
ing that medicine should refocus its goals from extending life to “enabl[ing] well-being”). 
 7 See Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries: Site 
of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 JAMA 
470, 473 tbl.2 (2013) (concluding that, although only 24.6% of patients died in hospital in 
2009 compared with 32.6% in 2000, percentages of deaths in long-term care facilities held 
steady at around 27% and deaths at home rose from 30.7% in 2000 to 33.5% in 2009). Esti-
mates about deaths in hospitals vary. See, e.g., YAFU ZHAO & WILLIAM ENCINOSA, 
HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, THE COSTS OF END-OF-LIFE 
HOSPITALIZATIONS 1 (Apr. 2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53605/ (describ-
ing data from 2007 indicating that one-third of Americans died in hospital).  
 8 See Teno et al., supra note 7, at 473 tbl.2 (noting that, in 2009, 29.2% of patients who 
died had received care in an ICU in the previous thirty days).  
 9 See Amresh Hanchate et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-Life Costs: Why 
Do Minorities Cost More than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 497–99 (Mar. 9, 
2009) (surveying use of expensive end-of-life interventions among a large sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries and finding patterns of substantial expenditure on life-sustaining treatment in the 
final six months of life). 
 10 The most recent data indicate that, in 2009, 28.4% of patients received hospice care 
for only three days or fewer before dying, an increase from 22.2% nine years earlier. Moreo-
ver, 29.2% of Medicare beneficiaries remained in an ICU during the final month of life com-
pared with 24.3% in the earlier period. See Teno et al., supra note 7, at 471–73. See also id. at 
473 tbl.2 (finding that 11.5% of patients had been hospitalized three or more times in the three 
months before death, up from 10.3% in the previous studied period). 
 11 In a very recent study that attempts to measure physicians’ perceptions of when they 
are delivering “futile” care to their patients, the data suggested that approximately 20% of pa-
tients in five critical care units studied were receiving futile or “probably futile” treatment. See 
Thanh N. Huynh et al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be Futile in Criti-
cal Care, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1887, 1889 & fig.1 (Sept. 9, 2013). 
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formed consent process and opts out.12 At the same time, we underutilize 
hospice and palliative care.13 
This is no small problem, and it is growing larger as the population 
ages. Choices about end-of-life care impact many individuals among the 
millions who die in the United States each year.14 Health care costs at 
the end of life are substantial.15 Numerous medical organizations and 
advocacy groups have begun to address the problem of overutilization of 
care at the end of life through improved training for health care provid-
ers and efforts to educate patients, families, and the public in general 
about the need for advance care planning.16 In the face of these pro-
 
 12 See Rachelle E. Bernacki & Susan D. Block, Communication About Serious Illness 
Care Goals: A Review and Synthesis of Best Practices, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1994, 
1997 (Oct. 20, 2014) (explaining that “our health care system is oriented toward providing 
life-sustaining treatment, unless a patient actively chooses against it”). 
 13 See Teno et al., supra note 7, at 474 (noting that, although the use of hospice services 
has increased during the early 2000s, only 42.2% of Medicare beneficiaries with dementia and 
59.5% of Medicare beneficiaries with cancer received hospice services at the time of death); 
Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Discussions with Physicians About Hospice Among Patients with 
Metastatic Lung Cancer, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 954, 955–56 (May 25, 2009) (find-
ing that only half of patients with stage IV lung cancer had had any discussion with their phy-
sicians about hospice in the two months prior to death); Corita Grudzen & Deborah Grady, 
Improving Care at the End of Life, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1202, 1202 (July 11, 
2011) (discussing over-use of therapeutic interventions at the end of life and advocating that 
better quality care often requires emphasizing palliative measures and avoiding unavailing 
therapies that risk unnecessary suffering and iatrogenic harm).  
 14 See Deaths: Final Data for 2013, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (noting that 2,596,993 
people died in 2013, equaling 821.5 deaths per 100,000 people).  
 15 It is well documented that one-third of medical expenses for the last year of life are 
spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and technologies in that final month ac-
count for nearly 80% of these costs. See Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last 
Week of Life: Associations with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL 
MED. 480, 480 (Mar. 9, 2009). Moreover, 30% of Medicare dollars spent pay for care for the 
5% of Medicare beneficiaries who die each year. See Amber E. Barnato et al., Trends in Inpa-
tient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERV. 
RES. 363, 364 (Apr. 2004). 
 16 For example, the American Society of Clinical Oncology has published a “best prac-
tices” model that recommends a series of conversations with patients with terminal cancer 
diagnoses, with various components to the ongoing discussion at sequential visits. See Thom-
as J. Smith et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology Provisional Clinical Opinion: The 
Integration of Palliative Care into Standard Oncology Care, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 880, 
880 (2012) (“While a survival benefit from early involvement of palliative care has not yet 
been demonstrated in other oncology settings, substantial evidence demonstrates that pallia-
tive care—when combined with standard cancer care or as the main focus of care—leads to 
better patient and caregiver outcomes. These include improvement in symptoms, [quality of 
life], and patient satisfaction, with reduced caregiver burden. Earlier involvement of palliative 
care also leads to more appropriate referral to and use of hospice, and reduced use of futile 
intensive care.”); see also Mission & Vision, AM. ACAD. ON COMM. HEALTHCARE, 
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foundly troubling trends, many commentators (myself included) have 
provided detailed critiques of how we die and how we can communicate 
better about dying. No one seems to have acknowledged, however, that 
this is very likely an insurmountable problem that will only get worse as 
our population ages. 
There are various ways to evaluate whether a dying individual is 
receiving “the right amount” of therapy or life-prolonging technology. In 
our health care system, the primary measure—based on both ethical 
principles and the law of informed consent—is to provide treatment that 
is subjectively consistent with the patient’s informed and autonomous 
wishes, values, and beliefs.17 One can also ask whether the treatment 
improves physical outcomes objectively by prolonging life or improving 
quality of life,18 or whether the cost of administering life-prolonging care 
at current levels is a wise expenditure of increasingly scarce health care 
dollars.19 By any of these measures, many dying patients are receiving 
“too much” therapy and life-prolonging care.20 
Many factors contribute to this situation, including a general cultur-
 
http://www.aachonline.org/About-AACH/Mission-Vision (last visited Mar. 2, 2016); ASS’N 
BEHAV. SCI. & MED. EDUC., http://www.absame.org/dcms/about (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) 
(providing information and resources for medical school and continuing medical education 
curricula). 
 17 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body . . . .”). 
 18 Recent evidence suggests that the answer to this question frequently is “no.” More 
therapeutic and life-prolonging interventions at the end of life are associated with poorer out-
comes. See Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-
Small-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 736–38 (Aug. 19, 2010) (finding that 
patients recently diagnosed with lung cancer who began receiving palliative care immediately 
lived an average of three months longer than patients who received standard therapeutic 
treatment only); Matthijs Kox & Peter Pickkers, “Less Is More” in Critically Ill Patients, 173 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1369 (June 10, 2013) (concluding, based on a meta-analysis of multi-
ple clinical trials, that many common treatments for critically ill patients pose a high risk of 
iatrogenic harm compared with their potential benefit and ought to be used more cautiously). 
 19 On this measure, it also appears that we are not spending health care dollars wisely. A 
recent analysis of health care costs concludes that up to 35% of Medicare dollars at the end of 
life and up to 12% of Medicare dollars in total are being spent on clinically unsupported 
treatments and procedures. See David Cutler et al., Physician Beliefs and Patient Preferences: 
A New Look at Regional Variations in Health Care Spending (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 19320, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19320 (concluding 
that “cowboy doctors” were more likely to recommend intensive care beyond guidelines and 
that such doctors, rather than patient demand for care, were the primary driving force behind 
regional variations in the intensity of care provided to the dying).  
 20 See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at the End of 
Life: Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent, 36 PACE L. REV. (forth-
coming 2016) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author). 
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al denial of death, physicians’ professional culture and fear of liability, 
physician avoidance of discussions about prognosis, and payment incen-
tives that encourage overutilization of medical technologies.21 One par-
ticularly important cause, which is the focus of this essay, is the failure 
of physicians and patients to have timely, thorough, and honest conver-
sations about care at the end of life. Here, one may posit that the better 
(though imperfectly) informed decisions resulting from these conversa-
tions can help reduce suffering and lead to care that more properly aligns 
with patients’ well-considered values and preferences.22 Because the de-
fault model is to provide life-sustaining care unless the patient opts out, 
conversations about prognosis and goals of care provide an essential op-
portunity for patients to convey to their physicians their values and pref-
erences about care at the end of life. In the absence of these detailed dis-
cussions, physicians in our health care culture assume that patients want, 
and consistently default towards, medical interventions even when they 
are actively dying.23 
The legal and ethical principle of informed consent creates a duty to 
inform patients of the risks and benefits of treatment and life-sustaining 
care (including likelihood of success measured by cure, palliation of 
symptoms, or extended life expectancy).24 The remainder of this essay 
examines informed consent at the end of life in the context of the many 
uncertainties in which it necessarily operates, and attempts to explain 
some of the underlying reasons for its dysfunction. To be clear, informed 
consent to treatment and life-prolonging technologies, implemented with 
as much content and compassion as possible, remains the goal. But it is 
worth acknowledging the multiple, and often insurmountable, obstacles 
to making a “perfect” highest-utility decision in end-of-life care circum-
stances. We can only do our best to support making the “right” decision 
and, even then, we should do so with the knowledge that this decision 
 
 21 See id. (manuscript at 6–12) (describing and discussing the contextual factors that 
drive overutilization of care at the end of life).  
 22 In a recent paper, Neal Feigenson and I wrote about the implementation of informed 
consent law in end-of-life decision making and discussed various practices, including shared 
decision making and the use of informational videos, to improve patients’ understanding of 
their choices. See id. (manuscript at 15–23). 
 23 See Bernacki & Block, supra note 12, at 1995–97. 
 24 See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-11 (3d ed. 2015) (explain-
ing that factors to be disclosed include diagnosis, nature and purpose of treatment, risks of 
treatment and, in some circumstances comparative data on the treating physician’s skills, al-
ternatives to the proposed treatment, prognosis with and without the treatment, and conflicts 
of interest); see also Noah & Feigenson, supra note 20 (manuscript at 22–27) (describing in 
detail the operation of informed consent law in the end-of-life context). 
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making will unavoidably remain subject to uncertainty and to our human 
limitations with regard to perfect rational choice. 
Both physicians and patients frequently are reluctant to have these 
conversations, so the first challenge to making “good” choices at the end 
of life is to somehow ensure that these conversations actually happen. 
Patients generally rely on physicians to initiate conversations about end-
of-life preferences,25 and surveys indicate that the public wants physi-
cians to discuss end-of-life issues.26 Physicians, in general, are better po-
sitioned to initiate these conversations as repeat players with superior 
knowledge and no personal emotional implications beyond those that are 
part of their professional role. At the same time, our culture, which de-
nies the reality of death and has little appetite for discussions about 
complex decisions at the end of life, presents a major obstacle to “good” 
decision making.27 More generally, this culture of denial translates into a 
pervasive discomfort with the precarity of life and a concomitant desire 
to avoid thinking about mortality, at least until this becomes unavoida-
ble. When these conversations do happen—even if we agree that “good” 
end-of-life decisions are decisions that reflect patients’ values and pref-
erences after a series of discussions with physicians to explain the op-
tions and their potential benefits and adverse effects, and even if physi-
cians and patients are willing to have these conversations together—
barriers to good decision making remain. 
Physicians and patients want to make the “best” choices about med-
ical care for terminal illness but, given their bounded rationality, lack the 
omniscience needed to calculate all future possibilities without error. All 
human decision making, including medical decision making, occurs un-
der conditions of irreducible uncertainty and resultant ambiguity. Phi-
losophers Samuel Gorovitz and Alasdair MacIntyre offer an interesting 
and relevant theory of the nature of physician fallibility.28 As they re-
count it, fallibility in medical decision making and treatment arises out 
of three distinct causes. The first is ignorance based on a limited under-
 
 25 See Karen Hancock et al., The Truth-Telling in Discussing Prognosis in Advanced 
Life-Limiting Illnesses: A Systematic Review, 21 PALLIATIVE MED. 507, 514–15 (2007). 
 26 See, e.g., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: September 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 
30, 2015), http://kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-september-2015/ 
(finding that 89% of those surveyed thought that doctors should discuss end-of-life care issues 
but that only 17% have actually had these discussions with a health care provider). 
 27 See generally Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in Preparing for Death, 
21 ELDER L.J. 1 (2013) (discussing cultural, legal, and other reasons why patients and physi-
cians avoid making end-of-life decisions). 
 28 See Samuel Gorovitz & Alasdair MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, 1 
J. MED. & PHIL. 51 (1976)). 
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standing of the medical issue—the physician has full access to infor-
mation and collects it but cannot subjectively fully understand it.29 The 
second is ineptitude based on the physician’s failure to access and follow 
available medical information—all of the information is available to ar-
rive at a “correct” diagnosis and treatment plan but the physician, while 
capable of understanding the relevant information, fails to fully collect 
and process the information.30 In either case, the physician either under-
performs and fails to follow best practices or the physician suffers from 
and applies biases that interfere with a (boundedly) rational processing 
of the information. Both of these forms of fallibility can be overcome 
with better (i.e., more skilled, more careful, and more rational) effort. 
By contrast, Gorovitz’s & MacIntyre’s third cause of fallibility is 
“necessary fallibility” in which that which must be understood scientifi-
cally in order to make the “best” decision simply cannot be known or 
predicted.31 In this scenario, no physician, no matter how skilled, careful, 
conscientious, and rational, can provide a solution or “best” recommen-
dation because the solution is (at least, ex ante) unknowable due to the 
unpredictability of the multiple (objectively unknown and unknowable) 
variables involved in any patient’s prognosis or response to a particular 
treatment—in spite of the statistical averages or likelihoods that general-
ly apply to the patient’s diagnosis. This type of necessary fallibility ap-
plies to every patient and every diagnosis and prognosis because every 
patient’s prognosis and future response to treatment remains subject to 
Knightian uncertainty.32 Not only is this uncertainty humanly unavoida-
ble, but the degree of uncertainty and its impact on patient outcomes is, 
ex ante, unknowable. Accordingly, even a most skilled, careful, consci-
entious and rational physician’s judgment can be 100% wrong about a 
particular patient’s prognosis or response to treatment. 
More specifically, let’s think for a moment about decisions with re-
 
 29 Id. at 65. 
 30 Id. at 62–63. 
 31 Id. at 63. “[W]e have provided a theoretical account of why it is that knowledge about 
the individual patient is not merely essential, but is always and necessarily potentially inade-
quate to the extent that damaging error may result from conscientious, well-motivated clinical 
intervention by even the best-informed physicians.” Gorovitz & MacIntyre, supra note 28, at 
65. 
 32 Knightian uncertainty refers to the idea that there are types of future contingent events 
and probabilities that are not capable of being quantified; hence, they are irreducible to quanti-
fiable risks. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT ch. 7 (1921). For a 
discussion of the application of Knightian uncertainty and its impact on every mode of ration-
al decision making, see generally René Reich-Graefe, Calculative Trust: Oxymoron or Tau-
tology?, 4 J. TRUST RESEARCH 66, 70–71 (2014). 
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spect to a cancer treatment using radiation that has a hypothetical 70% 
chance of success and a 30% chance of “no success” based on past ap-
plication and experience. It is known that radiation kills cancer cells—
this is an example of a knowable fact that is also actually known—a 
“known known.” It is also known that radiation will do damage to other 
parts of the body but not known what or how bad the damage might be 
in a particular person—this is an example of a “known unknown” con-
tingent outcome. Based on the known knowns and known unknowns, a 
patient must make a decision about radiation treatment. The 70% chance 
of success only correlates with the known knowns and the known un-
knowns—and only as a statistical average for a homogenized group of 
past cancer patients. These statistical averages are still useful, however. 
As Lawrence Schneiderman has observed,  
  Most of us probably would agree that if a treatment has not worked in the 
last 100 cases, almost certainly it is not going to work if it is tried again. . . . 
The experience of 100 cases is attainable in many areas of medicine. This pro-
posal is . . . one that seeks reasonable consensus where absolute certainty is 
impossible and therapeutic benefit is the goal.33 
But acknowledging this point is only the first step to accepting the full 
extent of uncertainty in making medical decisions. 
The patient’s decision based on the statistical 70% chance of bene-
fit described above, however, also entirely ignores the additional catego-
ry of “unknown unknowns”—those contingent future variables impact-
ing patient outcomes that are objectively unknowable at the time of 
decision making.34 To make as rational a decision as possible, physicians 
and patients must acknowledge that unknown unknowns may always ex-
ist and may substantially impact the prognosis calculus and that they do 
not and rationally cannot know the extent of the unknown unknowns or 
how they might apply to the patient’s particular case. The 70-30 success 
ratio might have only a 10% application in the particular case due to un-
 
 33 See Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Defining Medical Futility and Improving Quality of 
Care, 8 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 123, 125 (2011) (adding that “in the end, we all will have to 
accept some empirical notion of medical futility or else throw all commonsense to the wind”). 
 34 Cf. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 280 (1961) (“The old 
scientific ideal of episteme—of absolute certain, demonstrable knowledge—has proved to be 
an idol. The demand for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific state-
ment must remain tentative forever. It may indeed be corroborated, but every corroboration is 
relative to other statements which, again, are tentative.  Only in our subjective experiences of 
conviction, in our subjective faith, can we be ‘absolutely certain.’”), cited in Schneiderman, 
supra note 33, at 124 n.1. 
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known unknowns unique to the patient, i.e., that this patient, because of 
variables, is 90% likely not to fall into the 70-30 benefit-risk calculus 
that applies to the broader population of like patients. Notwithstanding 
this non-quantifiable-in-advance Knightian uncertainty (of known un-
knowns and unknown unknowns), patients who desire to live will form 
expectations35 based on statistical averages, although these expectations 
may be irrational. Physicians, when they fail to acknowledge to them-
selves or disclose to patients this form of necessary fallibility, become 
complicit in patients’ demanding and receiving potentially ineffective 
and harmful care. 
In the specific context of medical decision making, the concept of 
clinical uncertainty is one form of necessary fallibility. Patients facing 
terminal illness frequently want their treating physicians to advise them 
as to the “best” treatment for their illness or condition. The problem is 
that, for multiple reasons, there is often no obvious “best” approach for 
any particular patient at any particular time. First, patients must under-
stand that what is “best” depends at least to some extent on the patient’s 
own goals of care. While one patient may be seeking maximal life ex-
tension no matter what the costs in terms of adverse effects, increased 
suffering, or medical dollars, another patient may prefer to focus on 
maintaining physical and intellectual functionality even at the cost of a 
potentially shorter lifespan. For this latter group of patients, the prospect 
of loss of meaningful ability to interact with the world might drive deci-
sions to focus more on palliation of symptoms than on life prolongation. 
Second, clinical uncertainty means that the ability of physicians and pa-
tients to make rational calculations about the comparative desirability of 
various options within the context of the patient’s subjective goals of 
care is always limited by the imperfections of predictive data on thera-
peutic response, adverse effects, and prognosis.36 
 
 35 See Niklas Luhman, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in  
TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 
1988) (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and 
you have to neglect . . . the possibility of disappointment . . . because it is a very rare possibil-
ity, but also because you do not know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of 
permanent uncertainty.”).  
 36  See generally JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK (2007) (discussing clinical 
uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment recommendations); see also George A. Diamond, Fu-
ture Imperfect: The Limitations of Clinical Predictive Models and the Limits of Clinical Pre-
diction, 14 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGISTS 12A (1989) (describing different ways in which statisti-
cal regressive models to predict clinical outcomes can go awry). Prognosis for meaningful 
recovery in many medical circumstances, such as for stroke patients, requires a discussion 
between physician and patient of complex variables such as the likelihood of regaining de-
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It is, therefore, impossible to determine with any rational certainty a 
“best” or “optimal” treatment before the fact. Even after the fact, uncer-
tainty will remain—who is to say that a different treatment might not 
have been better? Patients (and perhaps physicians) mistakenly view 
these sorts of decisions like forks in the road at which one can take a 
“right turn” or a “wrong turn” when they are in fact more like a river 
delta into which multiple rivers flow but all of which end up in the sea. 
Choosing the best treatment is very different from a financial investment 
in which one attempts to buy the “best” stock. With stock investing, one 
can look at past data and make a bet. If the initial money invested creates 
a return, one can assess retrospectively whether the chosen stock gave 
the best return on investment by comparing how the money would have 
performed if invested in a different stock. With humans and medical 
treatment, by contrast, one can never look back and assess with any cer-
tainty whether a different choice would have been “better”—because 
humans can only make the investment once and with no ability to com-
pare alternative outcomes. Moreover, as soon as a treatment decision has 
been made and implemented, biases will often kick in in order to shore 
up confidence in the decision. At some point, patients have to make a 
decision and begin (or forgo) treatment, and they naturally crave reas-
surance that they are doing the “best” thing. These decisions are perhaps 
“informed” to the extent that physicians provide information about like-
lihood of success, but the concept of “informed” is greatly limited by the 
fallibility factors described above.   
Necessary fallibility encompasses the idea that a patient’s ability to 
make truly informed decisions about end-of-life care is limited by the 
patient’s (and physician’s) own abilities to process complex information 
rationally.37 In addition, both physicians and patients also regularly em-
 
grees of physical function and this, too, is difficult to predict as a scientific matter because 
there are so many variables. A meta-analysis of data from multiple studies on the recovery of 
stroke patients who were receiving mechanical ventilation found that prognosis was generally 
poor, with 58% of these patients dying within 30 days, but that a minority of patients survived 
without severe disability. See Robert G. Holloway et al., Prognosis and Decision Making in 
Severe Stroke, 294 JAMA 725, 725–27 & tbl.1 (Aug. 15, 2005). The authors of this study cau-
tion that physicians can be unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic in various circumstances 
and argue that physicians should think carefully about how they convey prognostic evidence. 
See id. at 729 & tbl.3 (offering the example of explaining to a patient a surgical intervention 
as giving a person “a 50% better chance of an improved outcome” versus that same interven-
tion increasing the person’s chance “of an improved outcome from 5% to 7.5%” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
 37 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 
(Feb. 1955) (describing the limitations of humans to process information due to limited access 
to data and limitations of intellectual calculative abilities as bounded rationality). 
Noah - FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/3/2016 2:58 PM 
702 Q U I N N I P I A C  L A W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 34:691 
 
ploy biases and heuristic shortcuts that will further interfere with bound-
edly rational informed decision making. Optimism bias constitutes one 
example of this sort of limitation in the context of decisions about treat-
ment and life-prolonging technologies for those with life-threatening ill-
ness. Patients tend to think they will be among the fortunate one percent 
who greatly outlive the statistical prognosis for their disease or who re-
spond unusually well to an otherwise non-curative therapy.38 Patients al-
so frequently discount the likely non-curative value of certain invasive 
treatments, either because this information is not included in the in-
formed consent conversations or, as is relevant here, because they have 
accidentally or deliberately failed to understand that it is impossible to 
predict with any accuracy the effects of the treatment in a particular 
case.39 With the plane already decelerating on the landing strip, these pa-
tients wonder whether and how it can take off again. Physicians also 
tend to be unduly optimistic, overestimating the remaining life expectan-
cies of seriously ill patients and conveying prognoses in overly optimis-
tic terms.40 
The fear of death and denial of mortality constitute the flipside and 
ultimate driver of unreasonable optimism and make confronting these 
ineluctably imperfect choices, reasoning through them in the context of 
personal beliefs and goals of care, and then making an informed but ra-
tionally never perfect choice very difficult. Truly informed consent re-
 
 38 See Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-Phase Oncology Trials, 33 
IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RES. 1 (2011) (finding that, although participants in an early phase 
trial understood that the treatment would not cure their cancer, a majority of those surveyed 
nevertheless exhibited an optimism bias in believing that the experimental drug would control 
their disease and that they would experience only benefits from the drug and no side effects). 
 39 With respect to chemotherapy for metastatic cancer, one study found that 69% of pa-
tients with lung cancer and 81% of patients with colorectal cancer mistakenly believed that the 
chemotherapy they were receiving was likely to cure their disease. See Jane C. Weeks et al., 
Patients’ Expectations About Effects of Chemotherapy for Advanced Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1616, 1619–20 (Oct. 25, 2012) (noting, however, that “[p]aradoxically, patients who 
reported higher scores for physician communication were also at higher risk for inaccurate 
expectations” regarding the curative potential of chemotherapy).  
 40 See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and Determinants of Error 
in Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 469, 470–71 (Feb. 19, 
2000) (finding that, in predicting patients’ remaining life expectancies, physicians were cor-
rect only 20% of the time and were over-optimistic 63% of the time and concluding that a 
closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over-optimistic predictions); Elizabeth 
B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to Patients with Cancer Near the 
End of Life, 134 ANN. INT. MED. 1096, 1099 (2001) (finding that, in communicating expected 
survival times to patients with terminal cancer, physicians were frank with patients only 37% 
of the time, provided deliberately inaccurate survival estimates 40.3% of the time and pre-
ferred to offer no estimate for 22.7% of the patients studied). 
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quires both courage and an understanding of the limits of knowledge, 
knowability, and rationality. So in every case, the ethical value of auton-
omy is to some extent a construct that assumes patients have endless 
time to process endless amounts of perfect and complete information to 
make a perfectly rational end-of-life decision. This is simply not the 
case. 
If a physician is completely honest, he or she must recognize and 
accept that necessary fallibility is impossible to overcome. In general, 
the word “fallibility” implies incompetence or failure, but in the context 
of necessary fallibility, the use of the word is inapt and actually harmful. 
There is nothing morally wrong with necessary fallibility, and physicians 
should not let this sort of uncertainty inhibit them from either disclosing 
the limits of knowledge to patients or from acknowledging to themselves 
that this sort of limit is okay and indeed inevitable.41 Both statistically 
and rationally it is clear that, in predicting the future, doctors can and 
will get it wrong without being wrong. Physicians are mortals with 
bounded rationality like the rest of us. In this sense, the whole idea of 
“best” treatment does not apply (either objectively with respect to medi-
cal data or subjectively with respect to a particular patient). Perhaps, it is 
some underlying sense of this unavoidable “fallibility” that leads physi-
cians and patients to want to do “everything” (and thus unwittingly rein-
force their optimism biases). Nevertheless, physicians must do the best 
they can. For these reasons, they have an ethical obligation to take the 
lead in initiating discussions about treatment choices and the use of life-
prolonging technologies. 
And so, the title of this essay attempts to capture the idea that in-
formed consent has its limits, but also that avoiding the effort to achieve 
truly informed consent is an irrational choice because it risks serious 
negative outcomes for patients. The cultural tendency to avoid thinking 
too much about mortality, even when one is terminally ill, together with 
 
 41 Cf. Gorovitz & MacIntyre, supra note 31 at 64–65 (discussing, in the context of claims 
about medical malpractice, the point that injury is no proof of a physician’s culpability). The 
authors write,   
If physicians were to act as if they recognized this point, they might become far less 
reluctant to acknowledge, systematize, and learn from injury. But that would re-
quire a widespread willingness on the part of patients also to acknowledge the 
point, and thereby to lower their expectations about what physicians can accom-
plish . . . . 
Id. at 65. I suggest here that the same analysis applies to physician recommendations with re-
spect to end-of-life interventions. Acknowledging fallibility would be a good thing for both 
physicians and patients if both can understand that this sort of fallibility does not also imply 
culpability. 
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physician avoidance of truthful and thorough conversation about the 
risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment and life-sustaining therapy, 
means that many dying patients will make an irrational choice to remain 
un(der)informed. When physicians take the path of least resistance and 
let this un(der)informed state continue, they do their patients no favors.42 
We all need to form some expectations about the future in order to 
function in the present,43 but the trick is not to get too attached to these 
expectations (whether it is flight path, time at cruising altitude, landing 
strip length or similar aspects of the future). Those people who 
acknowledge on a daily basis the uncertainty of the future and the pre-
carity of life are probably going to be more readily able to accept the 
idea of terminal illness and to make treatment decisions that are both 
well-informed (as to known knowns, known unknowns, and the un-
knowable impact of unknown unknowns) and consistent with their indi-
vidual values and goals of care. And accepting uncertainty—about prog-
nosis or efficacy of treatments—will be easier for patients whose 
physicians also acknowledge and discuss the uncertainty that is inherent 
and unavoidable in virtually all complex medical care decisions. Physi-
cians themselves, by the very nature of their work, live with clinical un-
certainty and life’s precarity every day and sharing this reality with their 
patients is more likely to bring patients and physicians together in a col-
laborative decision-making team than to destroy hope or leave patients 
feeling abandoned. It also can optimize the rationality of patients’ in-
formed consent and thus their confidence in having made a proper 




 42 Of course, these sorts of conversations are necessarily emotionally challenging, and 
more so if the patient exhibits reluctance. See Elisa J. Gordon & Christopher K. Daugherty, 
‘Hitting You Over the Head’: Oncologists’ Disclosure of Prognosis to Advanced Cancer Pa-
tients, 17 BIOETHICS 142 (2003) (describing the results of a small focus group discussion with 
physicians in which many expressed reluctance to convey statistical details about prognosis 
because they felt that the information would seem too abrupt and would interfere with pa-
tients’ hope). But without some information about what is knowable about the patient’s prog-
nosis, patients are more likely to consent to treatment that provides no benefit while simulta-
neously exposing them to serious adverse effects. 
 43 See Luhman, supra note 35. 
